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I. INTRODUCTION
Carol is fifty-three and has cancer that has metastasized to her brain
and liver.1 She is enrolled in Medicaid.2 Her long-term primary care
physician recently informed her that she is no longer treating Medicaid
patients.3 Randy is forty-six and has been unemployed for fifteen
months.4 He is enrolled in Medicaid and in desperate need of a root
canal.5 His local dentist recently informed him that Medicaid no longer
covers the procedure.6 Shannon has an eight-year-old son who needs his
He is enrolled in Medicaid.8
tonsils and adenoids removed.7
Unfortunately, the nearest specialist that accepts Medicaid patients is
more than two hours away.9
Due to the current financial crisis, states are cutting Medicaid to
balance financially-strained state budgets.10 Some states are taking a
hard look at opting out of Medicaid altogether.11 On March 23, 2010,
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(The Affordable Care Act),12 which adds approximately seventeen
million new beneficiaries to already strained Medicaid rolls.13 Despite
this mandate, Congress has failed to enact fundamental reimbursement
reforms needed to assure access to quality care.14
1 Steven Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients Are Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/policy/16medicaid.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Sack, supra note 1.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Marilyn Werber Serafini and Julie Appleby, States May Face Showdown With
Feds Over Cutting Medicaid Rolls, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Feb. 3, 2011,
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/January/28/medicaid-maintenance-ofeffort.aspx.
11 Althea Fung, Texas Considers Opting Out of Medicaid, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Nov.
15,
2010,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/texas-considers-opting-out-of-medicaid20101115.; David McGrath Schwartz, Wary of Health Care Reform, Gibbons Weighs
Rejecting Federal Medicaid Funds, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 15, 2010,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/jan/15/wary-health-care-reform-gibbonsweighs-rejecting-f/.
12 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
13 Karyn Schwartz & Anthony Damico, EXPANDING MEDICAID: COVERAGE FOR LOWINCOME ADULTS UNDER HEALTH REFORM 1, 1 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
2010).
14 David Hogberg, ObamaCare Rules For Paying Doctors Might Spur Exodus,
INVESTOR’S
BUSINESS
DAILY,
Mar.
30,
2010,
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=528916; Pay Wechsler &
Chad Terhune, Dr. Orr Begins Home Pilot as Health Law Brings Medicaid Surge,
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For example, Medicaid reimbursement rates are still well below
those of Medicare and private insurance.15 The Affordable Care Act and
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 make strides
towards increasing access by tying Medicaid rates to Medicare
reimbursement; however, the rate match applies only to care furnished
by primary care physicians in 2013 and 2014.16 Moreover, the scope of
Medicaid providers classified as primary care physicians is narrow17 and
does not include care providers in the most needed specialty practices.
Thus, even after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, patients
continue to face a two-tiered payment system resulting in disparities in
access to care. This Comment explores Medicaid’s Equal Access
provision,18 also known as § 30A, which Congress enacted to assure
access to care among Medicaid beneficiaries.19 This broad and worthy
goal has run into multiple road blocks in the hands of the judiciary, and
Congress has been quite slow to respond.20
Traditionally, providers and beneficiaries could enforce the Equal
Access provision under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a civil rights claim by
asserting that Medicaid reimbursement was so low that it discouraged
provider participation and detrimentally impacted access to care.21 In the
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-31/dr-orrbegins-home-pilot-as-health-law-brings-medicaid-surge.html.; John V. Jacobi, Medicaid
Cuts: Where’s the Outrage?, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (March 16, 2010),
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/03/16/medicaid-cuts-where%e2%80%99s-theoutrage/ (“If Medicare services or provider rates were cut, or threatened to be cut to
balance the budget, the firestorm would be epic. Republicans would accuse Democrats
suggesting such cuts of stealing from the elderly. Democrats would accuse Republicans
suggesting such cuts of trying to abolish Medicare. AARP would express outrage, and if
it didn’t do so loudly enough tea partiers would urge seniors to burn their AARP cards in
an incongruous support of a government health care program. So where’s the outrage
when states faced with budget cuts look first to cut Medicare’s sister program,
Medicaid?”).
15 See Stephen Zuckerman, Aimee F. Williams & Karen E. Stockley, Trends in
Medicaid Physician Fees, 2003-2008, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 510, 517 (Apr. 2009).
16 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029.
17 Id. (matching Medicaid payments for family medicine, general internal medicine,
and pediatric medicine at 100% or more of Medicare payments for primary care).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (2006); see Part III infra.
19 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A).
20 Abigail R. Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal
Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 677 (2006); Edward Alan Miller, Federal
Administrative and Judicial Oversight of Medicaid: Policy Legacies and Tandem
Institutions under the Boren Amendment, PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM (2007);
Jacobi, supra note 14.
21 Pre-Gonzaga, a circuit split existed regarding whether providers or beneficiaries
could enforce the equal access provision using 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compare Pa.
Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002), and Walgreen Co. v. Hood,
275 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that providers are not intended beneficiaries and do
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1990s, a circuit split developed regarding the provision’s interpretation.22
After the landmark decision by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga
University v. Doe,23 providers and beneficiaries seeking to enforce the
Equal Access provision pursuant to § 1983 have achieved success in only
one circuit, leaving five sister circuits that refuse to recognize a cause of
action.24 Now, rather than filing suit under § 1983, providers and
patients are seeking to enforce § 30A under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution.25 Having achieved success under this novel
cause of action,26 courts are being asked to re-examine a revived preGonzaga circuit split with respect to the statute’s interpretation. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to hear a case addressing
whether providers and patients have a cause of action under the
Supremacy Clause to enforce the Equal Access provision.27 The Court,
however, declined to hear argument regarding the interpretation of the
statue.28 The Court will hear oral argument with respect to the ability to
enforce the Medicaid statute via the Supremacy Clause during its 2011
term.29
not have a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce § 30(A)), with Visiting Nurse Ass’n of
N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1004 (1st Cir. 1996), Methodist Hosp., Inc. v.
Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996), and Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6
F.3d 519, 526 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that providers have a cause of action under § 1983
to enforce 30(A)). See also Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997)
(hearing and deciding in favor of a provider (hospital) based on a § 1983 cause of action
seeking to enforce 30(A), but never addressing the hospital’s right to sue as a provider).
22 Compare Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998), Minn. Homecare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th
Cir. 1997), and Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 51, 530 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
that § 30(A) is a procedural standard that requires a study), with Evergreen Presbyterian
Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 933 (5th Cir. 2000), Rite Aid, Inc. v. Houstoun,
171 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1999), and Methodist Hosps, Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030
(7th Cir. 1996)(noting that § 30(A) is not procedural and does not require a study but a
substantive result).
23 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
24 Compare Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007),
Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006), Westside Mothers v. Olszewski,
454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006), Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005), and
Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004), with Pediatric
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006),
vacated on other grounds, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142 (2007).
25 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009);
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
Conn. Assoc. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Rell, No: 3:10-CV-136 (D. Conn. Feb. 16,
2010).
26 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).
27 Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3349 (2010).
28 Id.
29 Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem. Hosp., No. 10-283, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 735, 735
(Jan. 18, 2011).
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This Comment, in Part II, provides a brief overview of the United
States health care system, including the Medicaid program and in Part
III, offers an analysis of the Equal Access provision. Part IV examines
the willingness of several circuits to enforce the provision under § 1983,
as well as their eventual retreat. Part V provides a brief overview of the
ability to enforce federal law, including the Equal Access provision,
under the Supremacy Clause. Finally, Part VI calls for Congress to
extend a private right of action to providers and beneficiaries allowing
private enforcement of Medicaid’s requirements and urges Congress to
provide states the option of accepting universal, federal rates, thus
discharging any liability under a private cause of action. Part VI also
urges Congress to expand and implement the accountable care
organization concept at the state-wide level in order to assure access to
quality care.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A. Health Care Spending: Costs and Coverage
Health care spending in the United States is projected to reach
19.3% of gross domestic product in 2019.30 Recently, health spending
was evenly split between the private and public sectors; but public
spending will likely comprise more than half of overall health
expenditures in 2012.31 Private sector spending consists of private
insurance,32 out-of-pocket payments,33 philanthropy, and charity care.34
Public sector health spending consists of Medicare and Medicaid,35
30 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY,
NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS GROUP, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS
2009-2019 (2010); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE
COSTS AND SPENDING (March 2009) (noting health spending includes public and private
expenditures and amounts to approximately $2.5 trillion, or $8,160 per U.S. resident).
31 Christopher J. Truffer, Sean Keehan, Sheila Smith, Jonathan Cylus, Andrea Sisko,
John A Poisal, Joseph Lizkonits & M. Kent Clemens, Health Spending Projections
Through 2019: The Recession’s Impact Continues, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 1 (Feb. 2010)
(noting the recession, rising unemployment, the aging baby boom population, and
changing demographics are all predicted to influence health spending over the upcoming
decade);
32
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND
SPENDING (March 2009) (noting that private insurance payments constitute 64% of
private sector spending).
33 Id. (noting that out-of-pocket payments constitute 22% of private sector spending).
34 Id. (noting that other expenditures constitute 13% of private sector spending).
35 JENNIFER JENSON, GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND
PROGRAMS: A DATA BRIEF 1, 5 (Congressional Research Service June 16, 2008) (noting
just under $1 trillion in public funds were allocated to health spending in 2006. Of this
amount, approximately 73% was spent on Medicare and Medicaid).
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veterans and employee benefits,36 research grants, and local public health
programs.37 Due to spiraling costs, these programs are embroiled in the
controversy surrounding health care reform.38 As noted by President
Obama, “[a]lmost all of the long-term deficit and debt that we face
relates to the exploding costs of Medicare and Medicaid . . . . And if we
don’t get control over that we can’t get control over our federal
budget.”39
The two largest components of public health spending are
Medicare, which provides medical assistance to those over sixty-five,40
and Medicaid, which provides assistance for the categorically needy.41
Effective 2014, all individuals with an income of less than 133% of the
poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid.42 Currently, those not
eligible for medical assistance from a publicly-funded program can
obtain insurance through employers, in the private market, or remain
uninsured.43 Effective 2014, all individuals will be required to obtain
health insurance.44

36 Id. (noting that approximately 6% of overall public health spending was for federal
employees, military personnel, and retirees in 2007).
37 Id. (noting that approximately 21% of overall public health spending was for other
expenditures such as SCHIP, the NIH, the FDA, Research, and State and Federal Public
health activity in 2007).
38 Transcript
of
Bipartisan
Healthcare
Summit
(Feb.
26,
2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/February/25/health-care-reformtranscript.aspx [hereinafter Healthcare Summit].
39 Id.
40 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006). Individuals 65 or over are eligible as well as those with
end stage renal disease, provided that the individual also meets certain additional
requirements such as citizenship or residency and employment tax provisions. Id.
41 Id. § 1396a(10)(A).
Medicaid eligibility must be granted based on financial
criteria to those belonging to a categorical group such as children, parents with dependent
children, pregnant women, and people with severe disabilities. Id.
42 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
43 CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED
AMERICANS IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH 1, 2 (2006). The uninsured population was
approximately 46.6 million or 15.9% of the population in 2006. Id. The employersponsored and individually-purchased market covered approximately 150 million or 68%
of the population in 1996. Id.
44 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
Compare Thomas More Law Ctr v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2010) (finding
minimum coverage constitutional) and Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125922 (Nov. 30, 2010) (finding minimum coverage provision constitutional),
with Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22464
(Mar. 3, 2011) (finding minimum coverage provision unconstitutional) and Virginia v.
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (2010) (finding minimum coverage provision
unconstitutional).
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Approximately 25% of Americans are enrolled in Medicare or
Medicaid.45 Enrollment is evenly split between the two programs, with
some populations covered by both.46 Due to the recent economic
recession, the aging baby boom population, and the Affordable Care Act,
enrollment in public programs is predicted to increase substantially.47
B. Federal and State Control
Under the current statutory framework, the federal and state
governments are required to provide medical assistance to eligible
Medicare is a federal program
providers and beneficiaries.48
administered by the federal government, while Medicaid is a federal and
state partnership administered by the states.49 The Medicaid Act is a
conditional spending statute that sets forth a federal framework in which
each state voluntarily agrees to implement a public health program
according to federal standards.50 In return for their participation, states
receive federal financial support.51 As Medicaid populations increase
and state budgets dwindle, every state that participates in the program is
obligated to maintain a federally-mandated level of care.52
Unlike the federal government, state governments are generally
bound by state constitutions that require a balanced budget.53 According
to the National Association of State Medicaid Directors, state budgets
shortfalls in 2011 will total $140 billion.54 Due to limited resources and
burgeoning obligations, states are looking to cut expenditures, and many
are looking to cut Medicaid.55 Medicaid cuts will likely impact the
access to and the quality of the care available to the neediest
populations.56

45 CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED
AMERICANS IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH 1, 2 (2006).
46 Id.
47 TRUFFER ET AL., supra note 31, at 1.
48 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006).
49 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
50 Id.
51 Id. For an in depth discussion, see Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid
at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 7 (2001).
52 Id. § 1396a(30)(A).
53 RONALD SNELL, STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS AND
PRACTICE (National Conference of State Legislatures 2004).
54 Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, States Consider Medicaid Cuts as Use Grows, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/politics/19medicaid.html.
55 Id.
56 Zuckerman, et al., supra note 15, at 517; see Sack & Pear, supra note 54.
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C. Medicaid
Congress enacted Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act in 1965.57 It is now the largest means-tested entitlement program in
the country.58 As of mid-2010, all fifty states had voluntarily agreed to
participate in the program.59 Of the approximately sixty million
Medicaid enrollees, half are children, accounting for $49 billion in
Medicaid expenditures. 60 In contrast, 10% of enrollees are elderly and
account for $77 billion in Medicaid spending.61 Long-term care makes
up almost one-third of total Medicaid expenditures, accounting for close
to half of all long-term care expenditures in the United States.62
Individuals with disabilities account for approximately 42% of total
Medicaid spending.63
In order to receive federal funds under Medicaid, a state must
submit a “state plan” for providing “medical assistance” to eligible
beneficiaries.64 The definition of “medical assistance” is unclear, and
thus, a circuit split has developed regarding its interpretation.65
Participating states are required to establish or designate a “single state
agency” to supervise the administration of the state plan that must
comply with statutory requirements established by the federal

57 See Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs Act (the Medicaid Act),
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq.).
58 Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 51, at 7.
59 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID: A PRIMER: KEY
INFORMATION ON THE NATION’S HEALTH PROGRAM FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE 4 (2009)
[hereinafter KAISER FOUNDATION].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 JUDITH FEDER, HARRIET L. KOMISAR, ROBERT B. FRIEDLAND, LONG-TERM CARE
FINANCING: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 33 (Georgetown University Long-Term
Care Financing Project 2007).
63 Id. (stating that individuals with disabilities account for 14% of enrollees and
account for $115.5 billion)
64 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006); Jane Perkins, Symposium: Barriers to Access to Health
Care: Medicaid: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 12 Health Matrix 7, 9–10
(Winter 2002).
65 Compare Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting
that medical assistance is solely financial), with Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st
Cir. 2002), and Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that medical
assistance means more than financial assistance including actual services). See Alison C.
Sorkin, Financial Assistance For Medicaid’s Continued Existence: The Need For The
United States Supreme Court To Adopt The Tenth Circuit’s Definition of Medical
Assistance, 85 DENV. U.L. REV. 725, 745–51 (2008) (arguing that medical assistance
should mean financial assistance); Kenneth R. Wiggins, Medicaid and the enforceable
Right to Receive Medical Assistance: The Need For A Definition of “Medical
Assistance”, 47 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1487, 1512 (2006) (arguing that a blanket
definition as financial and actual services is not practical).
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government.66 For example, states must provide certain types of care67
and abide by the statutory eligibility criteria.68 Overall, the Medicaid Act
and its regulations provide states a degree of flexibility in determining
eligibility, benefits, and reimbursement rates.69
When states participate in the program, the federal government
matches a percentage of the state’s Medicaid expenditures.70 This is
called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).71 There is no
upper limit on the amount the federal government spends on Medicaid
because its matching FMAP portion is wholly dependent on state
expenditures.72 FMAP ranges from a required minimum of 50% to
approximately 75%.73 Effective 2014, FMAP will substantially increase
to cover newly enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries under the Affordable
Care Act.74 This increase should help states accommodate the increased
obligation under the health reform legislation.
To receive medical assistance, eligible patients register with the
appropriate state agency75 and the state then reimburses providers for
care.76 Alternatively, states may purchase a managed care plan which
reimburses providers at a negotiated rate.77 Congress does not require
private providers to participate in Medicaid, but has instead enacted a
66

42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
For example, inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospital care, nursing facility care,
physician services, labs and x-rays, family planning early periodic screening diagnostic,
and treatment services for those under 21. Id. § 1392a(10)(A).
68 Enrollment is based on categorical and financial eligibility and state
residency/citizenship. Id. § 1396a. Effective 2014, all individuals earning less than
133% of the poverty line will be eligible for Medicaid. Id.
69 Id. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 51, at 20–25.
70 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.
71 Id. See KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 19; CHRISTIE PROVOST PETERS,
FMAP: THE FEDERAL SHARE OF MEDICAID COSTS 1 (The National Health Policy Forum,
George Washington University Jan. 15, 2009).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.
73 74 Fed.Reg. 62315-17 (Nov. 27, 2009).
For example, Maryland and
Massachusetts receive a 50% federal match for state funds spent on medical assistance,
while Mississippi and West Virginia receive an approximate 75% federal match for state
funds spent on medical assistance. Id.
74 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). FMAP
for state spending to cover newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries under the Affordable
Care Act is 100% in 2014-2016, 95% in 2017, 94% in 2018, 93% in 2019, and 90% in
2020 and each year thereafter. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: SUMMARY OF COVERAGE PROVISIONS, (2010).
75 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
76 Id. See KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 13.
77 KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 59, at 13 (noting that the most common delivery
system for Medicaid assistance is managed care, with nearly 2/3 enrolled in a form of
managed care such as a health maintenance organization or primary care case
management arrangement).
67
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flexible statutory framework that allows states to set reimbursement rates
in order to entice enough providers to assure patients’ access to care.78
Provider participation is financially motivated,79 and often influenced by
administrative difficulties and numerous other factors.80 On average,
physician reimbursement rates for Medicaid are approximately 60% of
Consequently, provider
the average private and public rates.81
participation in Medicaid is low, as is access to care.82
In contrast, many hospitals and facilities are required to provide
care in particular circumstances under the Hill Burton Act,83 the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act,84 and state charity care
78

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A).
See Zuckerman et al., supra note 15, at 517; Sack, supra note 1; Jacob Goldstein,
Should Medicaid Pay More for Primary Care?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/01/06/should-medicaid-pay-more-for-primary-care/;
James A. White, Hey, Docs: Walgreens Also Says Medicaid Doesn’t Pay Enough, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/01/14/hey-docs-walgreens-alsosays-medicaid-doesnt-pay-enough/; Jonathon Cohn, On the House: How The Health Care
Bill Could Make Doctors Richer and Help the Poor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 5, 2010,
http://www.tnr.com/article/health-care/the-house.
80 See Jessica Greene, Jan Blustein and Beth C. Weitzman, Race, Segregation, and
Physicians’ Participation in Medicaid, 84 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 239, 239 (2006)
(race). See Peter Margolis, Factors Associated with Pediatricians’ Participation in
Medicaid in North Carolina, 267 JAMA 1942, 1942 (1992) (cultural barriers and
misinformed physicians). See Senator John Barrasso, Health Care Summit (Feb. 25,
2010) (potential Medicare malpractice liability). The Senator first noted that “many,
many doctors . . . take care of everyone, regardless of ability to pay.” Id. Then, in
response to current reform proposals to expand coverage through Medicaid, the Senator
stated, “to put 15 million more people on Medicaid, a program where many doctors in the
country do not see them . . . how are you going to help those folks? And, Mr. President,
when I talk to doctors, they say, I have a way: Put all the doctors who take care of
Medicaid patients under the Federal Torts Claim Act. That will help them, because
they’re not getting paid enough to see the patients. But if . . . they accept those patients
and then their liability insurance is covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act, I think
you’d have a lot more participation in that program.” Id.
81 See Zuckerman et al., supra note 15, at 510.
82 Sean Jessee, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal Access
Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 791, 796 (2009) (citing
various studies regarding provider participation in Medicaid including Janet D. Perloff et
al., Which Physicians Limit Their Medicaid Participation, and Why, 30 Health Servs.
Res. 7, 7–8, 22 (1995); Christine M. Shaffer, The Impact of Medicaid Reforms & False
Claims Enforcement: Limiting Access by Discouraging Provider Participation in
Medicaid Programs, 58 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1002 (2007).
83 The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (the Hill-Burton Act), P.L. 79-725
(1946), required hospitals to provide uncompensated care for 20 years after receiving
federal funds to modernize hospitals. The Hill-Burton Program of 1975, Title XVI of the
Public Health Service Act, provided financial subsidies to health facilities and required
the participating facilities to provide care uncompensated care to eligible individuals.
84 EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006), requires that hospitals that accept
Medicare and have an emergency department provide a medical screening to determine
whether an emergency medical condition exists, and if so to provide stabilizing treatment.
79
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statutes.85 Yet, even when required to provide care, hospitals are not
immune against inadequate rates and continue to lose approximately
$0.14 on every dollar spent on Medicaid care.86 For example, private
insurance has historically paid hospitals twice the amount paid by
Medicaid and Medicare rates are generally two-thirds higher than
Medicaid reimbursement.87 This discrepancy has resulted in hospital
closures in medically underserved areas, limited health care access for
the poor, and a rise in inadequate care due to inadequate personnel and
equipment.88
Under the new reform legislation, the number of individuals
eligible to enroll in Medicaid will undoubtedly increase.89 Due to a
variety of political and financial pressures, states are contemplating cuts
to already low Medicaid reimbursement rates.90 In turn, providers will
likely file suit to preserve access for Medicaid patients.91 Given the
economic crisis and Medicaid’s expansion, the courts will continue to be
at the center of the controversy, namely, the enforceability and
interpretation of Medicaid’s guarantees.92

85 Many states also mandate that certain types of hospitals provide care regardless of
an individual’s ability to pay. See N.J.S.A. 26:28-18 et al. (creating a program to
reimburse charity care payments). Finally, while its pervasiveness may be debated,
bankruptcy certainly plays a role as an alternative health care safety net. See David
Dranve & Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 74, 74 (Feb. 2006); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical
Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 239, 240 (2010).
86 WILL FOX & JOHN PICKERING, HOSPITAL & PHYSICIAN COST SHIFT: PAYMENT
LEVEL COMPARISON OF MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND COMMERCIAL PAYERS 5 (Milliman
Dec. 2008).
87 Id.
88 Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and
Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J. L. AND MED. 191, 198 (1995).
89 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
90 Sack & Pear, supra note 54.
91 Susan Haigh, Nursing Homes Sue State of Connecticut, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29,
2010,http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010921081_apctnursinghomesla
wsuit1stldwritethru.html. The Connecticut Association of Health Care Facilities filed a
lawsuit against Gov. M. Jodi Rell in federal court due to the states inadequate nursing
home Medicaid spending. Id.
92 On average the federal government provides over half of Medicaid funds.
CHRISTINE SCOTT, FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP) FOR MEDICAID,
1 (Congressional Research Service, 2005). Yet, many financially strapped states argue
that when Congress increases the number of individuals eligible for Medicaid and
expands benefits, it does so by simply creating a new set of unfunded mandates. See
Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, Governors Fear Medicaid Costs in Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/health/policy/20health.html.
In
response to recent reform proposals to expand Medicaid in order to provide greater
access to care, Gov. Phil Bredesen of Tennessee stated fears regarding “the mother of all
unfunded mandates.” Id. Similarly, Gov. Chris Gregoire of Washington stated, “[a]s a
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As one health scholar has suggested, “Medicaid is a program loved
by few, denigrated by many, and misunderstood by most.”93
Notwithstanding, many scholars are quick to point out that “Medicaid
has served as a legislative vehicle for an astonishing range of medical
and public health initiatives.”94 United States Senator Lamar Alexander
of Tennessee said that Medicaid’s expansion “dumps 15 to 18 million
low-income Americans into a Medicaid program that none of us would
want to be a part of because 50% of doctors won’t see new patients. So
it’s like giving someone a ticket to a bus line where the busses only run
half the time.”95
Importantly, Medicaid’s Equal Access provision96 requires that
states “assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care
and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such
care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area.”97 The statute’s goal is to prevent the exact concerns
expressed by opponents of Medicaid’s expansion. Thus, if Senator
Alexander is right—and there is substantial evidence that Medicaid
participants face significant obstacles to accessing care98—then states are
violating federal law when they adopt low rates that negatively impact
access. Alternatively, the federal law may be so lax in its enforcement
and mandates that it has become substantively ineffective. Although the
Affordable Care Act recognizes disparities in access and seeks to expand
coverage by increasing Medicaid enrollment, it fails to address
fundamental problems that arise, at least in part, due to limited federal
oversight and low state reimbursement rates creating a two-tiered,

governor, my concern is that is we try to cost-shift to the states we’re not going to be in a
position to pick up the tab.” Id.
93 Alan Weil, There’s Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 13, 15
(Jan./Feb. 2003).
94 Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 51, at 9 (noting the reduction of infant
mortality among low income populations, the improvement of community based longterm care for the elderly and disabled, the provision of insurance for low income
individuals, aid to safety-net hospitals, and coverage with of women with breast and
cervical cancer).
95 Senator Lamar Alexander, Healthcare Summit, supra note 38.
96 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30(A)) (2006). See Part III, infra.
97 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A). For a general discussion see Watson, supra note 88.
98 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES AND ACCESS
TO CARE, (October 2009); Donald B. Marron, Acting Director of the Congressional
Budget Office, CBO Testimony regarding Medicaid Spending Growth and Options for
Controlling Costs before the United States Senate Special Committee on Aging 17 (Jul.
13, 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/73xx/doc7387/07-13-Medicaid.pdf.
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fragmented system of care.99 In order to ensure access to quality care for
the newly covered Medicaid beneficiaries, it is crucial to reform
Medicaid’s reimbursement and enforcement mechanisms, specifically
the Equal Access provision.
III. THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION: 42 U.S.C. § 1396A (30)(A)
From 1965 to 1972, the federal government rarely reviewed
Medicaid reimbursement rates set by the states.100 After 1972, Congress
required states to pay rates set by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) based on the Medicare program.101 In order to
encourage greater flexibility in state decision-making, Congress amended
this requirement, enacting the Boren Amendment in 1980.102 The Boren
Amendment required states to adopt rates that were “reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities.”103 In 1997, Congress repealed the
Boren Amendment which “in essence . . . allowed states to divorce
Medicaid rates from the cost of care, possibly further restricting the rates
paid to hospitals for services to Medicaid patients.”104
In 1989, Congress enacted the Equal Access provision (“§
30(A)”).105 Like the Boren Amendment, § 30(A) regulates state
Medicaid rates.106 Unlike the Boren Amendment, § 30(A) focuses
primarily on access rather than costs.107 Initially, language similar to that
99 Dennis G. Smith, Medicaid Expansion Ignore States’ Fiscal Crises, The Heritage
Foundation, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/MedicaidExpansion-Ignores-States-Fiscal-Crises. See Healthcare Summit, supra note 38. U.S.
Representative Peter Roskram stated, “I think one of the problems, to get to this coverage
issue, is that the premise of this bill is that coverage is expanded through Medicaid,
welfare.” Id.
100 Edward A. Alan, Federal Administrative and Judicial Oversight of Medicaid:
Policy Legacies and Tandem Institutions under the Boren Amendment, 38 PUBLIUS: THE
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 315, 321 (2007).
101 For an in depth discussion, see Rosemary H. Ratcliff, The Mistakes of Medicaid:
Provider Payment During the Past Decade and Lessons For Health Care Reform in the
21st Century, 35 B.C. L. REV 141, 144 (1993).
102 Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment); Pub. L.
No. 97-35 § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981); (Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2174(a), 95 Stat. 809
(1981)).
103 Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment).
104 BARBARA A. ORMOND AND HEIDI KAPUSTKA, IMPACT OF BOREN AMENDMENT
REPEAL ON HOSPITAL SERVICES FOR MEDICAID ELIGIBLES 6 (2003).
105 42 U.S.C. 1396a(30)(A); Watson, supra note 88, at 198–99.
106 42 U.S.C. 1396a(30)(A); Watson, supra note 88, at 198–99.
107 Compare 42 U.S.C. 1396a(30)(A) (noting that rates must be sufficient to enlist
providers so that services are available under Medicaid to the extent available to the
general population), with Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (noting rates
must be “reasonable and adequate to meet the costs” of providers).
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of § 30(A) was found only in regulations and required that “payments
must be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the
plan are available to recipients at least to the extent that those services
are available to the general population.”108 Congress then acknowledged
the lack of enforcement by inserting the language of the regulation into
the Medicaid Act.109 Thus, § 30(A) requires that a state plan must:
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization
of, and the payment for, care and services available under the
plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary
utilization of such care and services and to assure[110] that
payments[111] are consistent[112] with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so
that care and services are available under the plan at least to the
extent that such care and services are available to the general
population in the geographic area.113

In order to measure a state’s compliance with the statute, the Secretary of
HHS has urged the courts to apply a multifactor test.114 The availability
of health services to the Medicaid population in a particular geographic
area is compared to that of individuals with private or public insurance in
the same area.115 The provision sets a floor for reimbursement rates by
108

42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (2010).
Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 526 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 389-90 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2060, 2115-16).
110 Rite Aid, Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 852 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1999) (quoting
“‘Assure’ is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘to make certain and put beyond
doubt. To . . . ensure positively.’ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 123 (6th ed. 1990).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “assure” similarly as ‘to make
certain the coming or attainment of: ensure,’ in its sixth definition for the term.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 133 (1986)).
111 Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood 235 F.3d 908, 932 n.31 (5th Cir.
2000) (“We note that the statute in section 30(A) speaks in terms of payments, rather than
rates. While a reimbursement rate is a form of payment, there are other types of payment
to providers, such as those to DSHs and, possibly, co-payments made by recipients.
These additional payments must also be taken into account in assessing whether the
payments in the aggregate will be adequate.”).
112 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997) (“‘Consistent’
means in agreement with, compatible, or conforming to the same principles or course of
action. […] For payments to be consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care,
they must approximate the cost of quality care provided efficiently and economically.”)
(citations omitted).
113 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A) (2006). For a general discussion see Watson, supra
note 88.
114 Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 576 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
115 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 390, reprinted in 1989 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1906, 2116; Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Supplement D: Medical Assistance
109
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requiring that rates are at least sufficient to ensure that providers are able
to offer quality care116 and access117 to the Medicaid population equal to
that of other individuals in the same market.118 The provision also
imposes a ceiling on provider payments, requiring that payments are no
more than what is efficient and economical.119 Fundamentally, § 30(A)
provides states with a degree of flexibility in setting provider payments,
but attempts to balance important stakeholder interests by protecting
participating providers, eligible patients, and the federal budget.120
Currently, the circuit courts are split regarding whether § 30(A)
imposes a procedural or a substantive requirement.121 The Eighth122 and
Ninth Circuits123 have held that § 30(A) requires states to conduct a study
Programs (1966-67) Part 7-5340). It is not clear, according to the circuit courts, whether
Congress intended that the entity charged with ensuring compliance by making the
comparative analysis is the Department of Health and Human Services, the state, or the
court. See Part IV, infra.
116 Bruce E. Landon, Eric C. Schneider, Sharon-Lise T. Normand, Sarah Hudson
Scholle, Gregory Pawlson, & Arnold M. Epstein, Quality of Care in Medicaid Managed
Care and Commercial Health Plans, 298 JAMA, 1674, 1674 (2007) (concluding that
Medicaid managed care enrollees receive lower quality care than private pay enrollees).
117 Teresa A. Coughlin, Sharon K. Long & Yu –Chu Shen, Assessing Access to Care
Under Medicaid: Evidence for the Nation and Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1073,
1073 (2005) (noting that national analysis show that access to care among Mediciaid
beneficiaries generally matches that of the privately insured, except for dental and
prescription drugs, but also noting that state-level analysis shows more variation and
presence of a gap in access).
118 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A); see Moncrieff, supra note 20, at 677.
119 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A); see Moncrieff, supra note 20, at 677.
120 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A).
Providers are ensured a sufficient rate of
reimbursement, patients are ensured quality and access, and the federal government is
ensured rates are not too high as to cover inefficient care. Id.
121 Compare Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 530 (8th Cir. 1993),
Minn. Homecare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997), and Orthopaedic
Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998)
(noting that § 30(A) is a procedural standard that requires a study) with Rite Aid, Inc. v.
Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1999), Methodist Hosps, Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026,
1030 (7th Cir. 1996), and Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908,
933 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that § 30(A) is not procedural and does not require a study but
only a substantive result).
122 Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit
held that Arkansas violated §30(A) “[b]ecause [the agency] failed to consider the rate
reduction’s impact on equality of access, efficiency, economy, and quality of care,” and
because its decision was driven by budgetary pressures. Id.
123 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F. 3d 1491, 1492 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth
Circuit held that in order to comply with § 30(A) , the state must consider the cost of
quality care. Id. Thus, the state must “rely on responsible cost studies, its own or others’,
which provide reliable data as a basis for its rate setting.” Id. Moreover, the rates
adopted must “bear a reasonable relationship to efficient and economical hospitals’ costs
of providing quality services, unless the state Department shows some justification for
rates that substantially deviate from such costs.” Id. A budget shortfall is not sufficient
to justify deviation from costs. Id. Because the state did not consider or study costs nor
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or investigation regarding the impact of rate cuts in order to satisfy
federal law.124 The Eighth125 and Ninth Circuits126 looked to the
purpose of §30(A)—to assure equal access to care—and suggested that
this purpose could not possibly be assured if Medicaid reimbursement
rates were driven by budgetary pressures and adopted without actually
considering the impact of such a decision on the access to and quality of
care. Conversely, the Third127 and Seventh Circuits128 have held that the
provision does not require procedural compliance, but instead requires
that states achieve a substantive result. The courts explained that the
statute does not contain language that requires a particular procedure,
consideration, or study with respect to access to care, but instead requires
states to achieve a result, meaning state Medicaid rates must actually
achieve equal access to care among Medicaid patients when compared to
private pay patients in the same geographic area. 129
The United States filed an amicus brief in early 2011 arguing that it
was not necessary for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari regarding the
interpretation of § 30(A) because HHS has agreed to issue an

offer a justifiable excuse, the court held that the reimbursement rate-setting procedure
violated § 30(A). Id.
124 Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F. 3d at 522; Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103
F.3d at1492.
125
Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F. 3d at 530–31.
126
Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F. 3d at 1500.
127 Rite Aid, Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 850 (3rd Cir. 1999). The court reasoned
that the language of the statute is outcome-oriented and leaves states with the flexibility
to set rates, as long as their decisions result in “substantive compliance with its specified
factors of efficiency, economy, quality of care, and access.” Id. The Third Circuit,
however, parted ways with the Seventh Circuit by holding that state rate setting decisions
must not be arbitrary or capricious as to violate principles of administrative law, rejecting
the view that a state could set rates like those in the private market and then respond to
the rate’s effect on quality and access. Id. Therefore, while § 30(A) did not require states
to consider costs or to rely on a study, under state agency principles, the decision must
not arbitrary or capricious. Id. By failing to consider an important aspect of the issue or
acting contrary to evidence, a state acts arbitrarily, but this does not suggest that a state
must consider or study all factors. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit interpreted § 30(A) as
mandating only substantive compliance like the Seventh Circuit, whereas the principles
of administrative law govern the procedural aspects the decision. Id.
128 Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1027.
The court held that that §
30(A)contains no procedural requirement, because when compared to the Boren
Amendment, which expressly required “findings,” the Equal Access provision is absent
of similar language. Id. Moreover, the court suggested that it is almost impossible for a
state to conduct a study to determine what effect a rate change will have, because a study
will likely be flawed by dishonest answers and lack of cooperation. Id. Therefore, the
court stated, the statutory language requires a state “to produce a result, not to employ
any particular methodology for getting there.” Id.
129
Houstoun, 171 F.3d at 851–52; Methodist Hosps, 91 F.3d at 1030.
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authoritative interpretation in the coming year interpreting the statute.130
The rule may include, “a determination whether [§ ](30)(A) protects
interests of providers at all following repeal of the Boren Amendment;
what procedural or substantive requirements the statute imposes on
States with respect to beneficiaries; and how the various provisions of
[§ ](30)(A) and other Medicaid requirements interact.”131 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari as to the interpretation of § 30(A), likely in
response to the position of the United States regarding the commitment
by HHS to issue a new interpretive rule.132 Notably, HHS issued a
proposed rule on May 6, 2011, to “create a standardized, transparent
process for States to follow as part of their broader efforts” to satisfy
§ 30(A).133
IV. ENFORCING THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION WITH 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides a mechanism to pursue civil remedies against state or local
actors who violate federal rights.134 In Blessing v. Freestone,135 the
Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to evaluate whether a statute
creates enforceable rights.136 Under this test, when a court hears a §
1983 suit in which the plaintiff alleges that a government actor violated
federal rights created by a statute, the court must (1) examine whether
Congress intended that the statute benefit the plaintiff, (2) determine
whether the right is not so “vague and amorphous” as to strain judicial
competence, and (3) assess whether the statute imposes an unambiguous
obligation on the state.137 The Court further stated that a right asserted
under a statute is only enforceable pursuant to § 1983 if it is “couched in
mandatory rather than precatory terms.”138
130 Brief of United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Resondents, Maxwell-Jolly v.
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4190 (2010).
131 Id.
132 Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem. Hosp., No. 10-283, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 735, 735
(Jan. 18, 2011).
133 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (May 6, 2011).
134 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”); see also Jane
Perkins, Using § 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L.
& POL’Y, 720, 720 (Mar./Apr. 2005).
135 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
136 Id.at 340–41.
137 Id..
138 Id. at 341.
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In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Association139 that a plaintiff could pursue a private cause of action under
§ 1983 to enforce a state’s compliance with Medicaid’s Boren
Amendment.140 The Court applied the Blessing test and said that “there
can be little doubt that health care providers are the intended
beneficiaries.”141 The Court further stated that “[t]he Boren Amendment
is cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms: the state plan ‘must’
provide for payment . . . of hospitals according to rates the State finds are
reasonable and adequate.”142
Finally, the Court observed that
“[a]lthough some knowledge of the hospital industry might be required
to evaluate a State’s findings with respect to the reasonableness of its
rates, such an inquiry is well within the competence of the judiciary.”143
The Court found that the Boren Amendment, with similar demands
as § 30(A), created rights enforceable by private citizens under § 1983.144
The Court also observed that “[t]he right is not merely a procedural one
that rates be accompanied by findings and assurances (however
perfunctory) of reasonableness and adequacy; rather the Act provides a
substantive right to reasonable and adequate rates as well.”145 After the
Wilder decision, which allowed private suits against states setting
inadequate Medicaid rates, Congress eventually repealed the Boren
Amendment; however, Wilder served as a seminal case for many
Medicaid enforcement actions throughout the 1990s and persists as a
seminal case for enforcing the Medicaid Act.146

139

496 U.S. 498 (1990).
Id. at 524.
141 Id. at 510. Supporting the proposition that Congress intended that providers could
file suit in federal court the Court noted that “in response to several States freezing their
Medicaid payments to health care providers, Congress amended the Act in 1975 to
require States to waive any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for violations of
the Act. Congress believed the waiver necessary because the existing means of
enforcement—noncompliance procedures instituted by the Secretary or suits for
injunctive relief by health care providers—were insufficient to deal with the problem of
outright noncompliance because they included no compensation for past
underpayments.” Id. at 516–17. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
142 Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
143 Id. at 520.
144 Id. at 524.
145 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
146 Interestingly, Chief Justice John Roberts, acting as Deputy Solicitor General at the
time, filed a brief in Wilder arguing that Medicaid’s Boren Amendment does not confer
rights enforceable under § 1983. See John Roberts’ Problematic Record on Disability
Rights,
The
Bazelon
Center
for
Mental
Health
Law,
http://www.bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/judicialnominees/roberts.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010).
140
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A. The Blessing Test
Under the Blessing test, applied by the Supreme Court in Wilder,
the circuit courts have consistently held that beneficiaries could pursue a
cause of action pursuant to § 1983 when seeking to enforce § 30(A).147
The circuit courts split when asked to determine whether providers could
also file suit.148 For example, in Arkansas Medical Society v.
Reynolds,149 the Eighth Circuit held that both providers and beneficiaries
could pursue a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce § 30(A).150 The
court reasoned that § 30(A) was intended to benefit providers because it
pertains to the level of reimbursement rates, and Congress also intended
to benefit beneficiaries by covering beneficiary access in the statute.151
Thus, the first prong of the Blessing test was satisfied as to both
providers and beneficiaries.152 The court stated that the mandatory
obligation requirement of prong two was also satisfied because the
language of the Medicaid Act expressly provided that a state “must”
comply, which was “wholly uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or
nudge.”153 Finally, the court reasoned that § 30(A) was not too vague
and amorphous as to strain judicial application because its legislative
history was clear, many federal courts had already held that the provision
was sufficiently specific, and when compared to the Boren Amendment
which passed the Blessing test in Wilder, the language of § 30(A) was
much less ambiguous.154
Conversely, in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood,155
the Fifth Circuit held that providers could not file suit under § 1983.156
147 Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson 362 F.3d 50 (2004); Ark. Med.
Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993); Visiting Nurse Ass’n v. Bullen, 93
F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908
(5th Cir. 2000).
148 Compare Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001), and Pa.
Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that providers are
not intended beneficiaries and do not have a cause of action under 1983 to enforce 30(A)
), with Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996),
Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 1996), and Ark. Med. Soc’y,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that providers have a cause of action
under 1983 to enforce 30(A)). See also Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th
Cir. 1997) (hearing and deciding in favor of a provider (hospital) based on 1983 cause of
action seeking to enforce 30(A), but never addressing the hospital’s right to sue as a
provider).
149 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993).
150 Id. at 526.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. (citations omitted).
154 Id. at 527.
155 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000).
156 Id. at 928–29.
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The Fifth Circuit applied the Blessing framework and concluded that the
thrust of the statute was directed at patient access, and Congress only
indirectly intended to benefit providers by ensuring that rates were set in
a manner consistent with this goal.157 Therefore, because the Fifth
Circuit held that providers, as opposed to beneficiaries, did not pass
prong one of the Blessing test, the court held that they could not pursue
claims under § 1983.158 The Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that “if
the reimbursement rate reductions should result in the widespread demise
of providers or discharge of Medicaid patients for fiscal reasons, the
access of Medicaid recipients to care and services . . . may violate section
30(A)’s command of equal access.”159 Yet, the court explained, under
the Blessing test, “the fact that evidence of financial distress is relevant
in a suit brought by Medicaid recipients does not amount to an individual
entitlement on the part of any provider under the statute.”160 In 2002, the
Supreme Court clarified the Blessing test, making judicial determinations
regarding whether a statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983
more consistent.
The new framework, however, has essentially
eliminated the ability of both providers and beneficiaries to successfully
pursue a cause of action enforcing § 30(A) under § 1983.
B. The Impact of Gonzaga
In Gonzaga v. Doe,161 the Supreme Court once again examined
whether a cause of action was available under § 1983 to enforce rights
created by federal law.162 The Washington Supreme Court held that the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) “gives rise to a
federal right enforceable under § 1983.”163 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a split among state courts and the federal circuits and
to clarify ambiguities in the Blessing test.164
The Court first reviewed its prior decisions on the issue, explaining
that the typical remedy for a state’s failure to comply with a Spending
Clause statute is the termination of federal funds.165 Next, the Court
stated that only twice has it held that Spending Clause legislation gives

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id.
Id.
Id. at 929.
Id.
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
Id.at 276.
Id.at 278.
Id.
Id. at 280.
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rise to enforceable rights.166 Finally, the Court discussed ambiguities in
its prior decisions167 and adopted a new test for determining whether a
federal statute creates rights enforceable under § 1983.168
According to the Gonzaga court, Congress must “speak with a clear
voice and manifest an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights.”169
In order to determine Congressional intent, the statute must be analyzed
for “right-or duty-creating language” that benefits the challenging
party.170 Next, rather than focusing on the aggregate population, a
statutory provision must focus on the individual.171 Finally, a centralized
enforcement mechanism – or “comprehensive remedial scheme” – in the
statute at issue supports the finding that there is no individual right to
pursue action under § 1983.172 Applying this framework, the Court held
that FERPA does not create a statutory right enforceable under § 1983.173
Since Gonzaga, several courts have similarly limited the availability of a
private cause of action to enforce federal law either by concluding that a
statute does not contain rights-creating language or focuses on an
aggregate population rather than particular beneficiaries.174
Post-Gonzaga, the circuits are split on whether a cause of action
under § 1983 is viable when enforcing § 30(A).175 For example, the
166 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280 (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)).
167 Id. at 282–83 (“[C]onfusion has led some courts to interpret Blessing as allowing
plaintiffs to enforce a statute under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within the general
zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect . . . . We now reject the notion that
our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of
action brought under § 1983.”).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 280.
170 Id. at 284 n.3 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
171 Jane Perkins, Issue Brief: Update on Federal Court Access – Medicaid § 1983 and
Preemption Cases, (Jan. 2007), www.nls.org/conf2007/1983%20preemption%20fact
%20sheet.pdf.
172 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 n.5.
173 Id. at 290. As an interesting aside, Chief Justice Roberts, prior to his appointment
to the Supreme Court, successfully argued Gonzaga before the Court. See John Roberts’
Problematic Record on Disability Rights, The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
http://www.bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/judicialnominees/roberts.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010).
174 Jon Donnenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State
Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1520–21
(2008); Jane Perkins, Using § 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 720, 720 (Mar./Apr. 2005).
175 Compare Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007),
Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006), Westside Mothers v. Olszewski,
454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006), Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005), and
Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004) with Pediatric
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006),
vacated on other grounds, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142 (2007).
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Eighth Circuit refused to overturn its pre-Gonzaga holding which
allowed providers to file suit under § 1983 alleging that a state Medicaid
agency violated § 30(A).176 The Eighth Circuit observed that Gonzaga
did not overrule Wilder.177 Moreover, the court stated that the
“proposition that the Medicaid Act may create enforceable rights, even
for health care providers, is far from novel.”178 Finally, and perhaps even
more importantly, the court interpreted § 30(A) under the Gonzaga
framework and held that even after Gonzaga, the plaintiffs still prevailed
because, among other things, Congress clearly intended for providers and
beneficiaries to benefit.179
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit readily overturned its pre-Gonzaga
decision. In Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins,180 the court noted the
effect of Gonzaga and held that under the new framework, § 30(A) is not
enforceable because the statute “speaks only to the state and the
Secretary” and focuses on the aggregate rather than the individual.181
Moreover, the court stated that the statute has a “systematic focus that
deals with institutional policy and procedures, rather than an
individualized focus concerned with whether the needs of any particular
person or class of recipients have been satisfied.”182
Since Gonzaga, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have ruled that there is no private right of action under
§ 1983 when enforcing § 30(A).183 The door is not closed, however, as
176 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 443 F.3d at 1015. Pre-Gonzaga, the Eighth Circuit
held that both providers and beneficiaries could file suit under § 1983. Ark. Med. Soc’y,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993). In Pediatric Specialty Care Inc., the state
requested that the Eighth Circuit overturn this decision to accommodate the Supreme
Court’s restrictive Gonzaga analysis and the court refused. 443 F. 3d 1005, 1015 (8th
Cir. 2006). First, the Eighth Circuit observed that Gonzaga was issued on June 20, 2002,
and while its decision was filed ten days before Gonzaga, its mandate did not issue until
July 2002. Id. “Thus, Gonzaga [was] not an intervening decision of a superior tribunal,
as is required before we may overturn matters previously settled as the law of the case.”
Id. Therefore, the court could not, as a matter of precedent and procedure, overturn its
decision regarding the ability to enforce § 30(A). Id.
177 Id.; see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
178 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 443 F.3d at1015.
179 Id.
180 509 F. 3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007).
181 Id. at 703.
182 Id. at 704. The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision which relied on
the pre-Gonzaga precedent. Id. The Fifth Circuit then remanded the claim with direction
to dismiss with prejudice. Id. The plaintiffs in Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. also
asserted a Supremacy Clause claim in the same case before the Fifth Circuit, yet the Fifth
Circuit did not address the claim and remanded with direction to dismiss with prejudice.
Id. Also, the district found in favor of the plaintiffs on the § 1983 claim, but strangely
predicts reversal on appeal due to the Gonzaga decision. Id.
183 Compare Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 56–59 (1st
Cir. 2004), N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147,
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the Eighth Circuit adamantly refused to let Gonzaga stand in the way of
provider and beneficiary rights under the Medicaid Act.184
Notwithstanding, as the ability to enforce rights under the Medicaid Act
narrows, providers and beneficiaries have since pursued new legal
theories when seeking to ensure state compliance.
V. EQUAL ACCESS AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries are now successfully pursuing
suits to enforce § 30(A) under the Supremacy Clause, reaffirming the
binding obligations of Medicaid on all states that choose to participate in
the program.185 The Medicaid Act is the supreme law of the land and
Medicaid’s Equal Access provision requires that states provide equal
access to quality care by setting reimbursement rates at an adequate level
to entice providers to participate.186 If a state refuses to comply by acting
contrary to the statute, its actions conflict with federal law.187 Where
state and federal laws conflict, the federal law prevails.188 Thus, if a state
reimburses providers at rates that are insufficient to assure quality and
access, the state is in violation of federal law and the unlawful state
action must be enjoined.189
A. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause states that the “Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”190
Unlike claims under § 1983 that involve securing a right to individuals,
148 (2d Cir. 2006), Pa. Pharmacists, 283 F.3d at 541–42, Equal Access for El Paso, Inc.
v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 702–03 (5th Cir. 2007), Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454
F.3d 532, 541–43 (6th Cir. 2006), Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir.
2005), and Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1146–48 (10th Cir.
2006), with Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005
(8th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551
U.S. 1142 (2007).
184 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 443 F.3d at 1015. But, see Minn. Pharm. Ass’n v.
Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 816 (D. Minn. 2010) (refusing to allow a § 1983 suit to
enforce § 30(A) despite the holding in Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services).
185 Supra, note 184.
186 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (2006).
187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d
1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).
188 Federal law and regulations have the same pre-emptive effect. See Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982).
189 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 543 F.3d at 1065.
190 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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preemption involves protecting the nation’s federal structure.191 Courts
apply a different standard when analyzing preemption claims.192
Jurisdiction under preemption theory does not invoke the Gonzaga
analysis; thus, providers and beneficiaries can successfully pursue a
cause of action under this theory as an alternative to § 1983.193
The Supreme Court, in PHRMA v. Walsh,194 implicitly affirmed the
theory that state law can be preempted by the Medicaid Act.195 In
PHRMA, the plaintiff alleged that a state regulation that required preauthorization for prescription drugs was preempted by the Medicaid
statute.196 Without expressly addressing preemption jurisdiction, the
plurality reached the merits of the case, thus implicitly affirming the
court’s jurisdiction.197
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether § 30(A)
preempts state law. Circuit courts, however, have enforced § 30(A)
under the Supremacy Clause, applying a conflict by implication
analysis.198 Under this theory, the challenging party bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption of a state statute’s validity, which can be
done here by showing an actual conflict with § 30(A).”199 According to
extensive Supreme Court precedent and decisions by the circuits, a cause
of action exists to enjoin a state from implementing legislation in
violation of federal law.200 The remedy for this cause of action, however,
is limited.201 Unlike a cause of action under § 1983, which can result in
the payment of civil penalties and attorneys fees, plaintiffs filing suit

191 Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 117 (1989); Verizon
Maryland Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
192 Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 117.
193 For an in depth discussion, please see Rochelle Bobroff, § 1983 and Preemption:
An Alternative Means of Court Access For Safety Net Statutes, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27
(2008); SARAH SOMERS, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, PREEMPTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
MEDICAID (National Health Law Program May 21, 2007).
194 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (plurality). See also Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 547 U.S. 268 (2006) (holding Medicaid Act preempts state law).
195 Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 331–32 (citing Walsh, 538 U.S. at
661–68).
196 Walsh, 538 U.S. at 675.
197 Id. at 661–69.
198 According to preemption doctrine, state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to
the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution” are preempted. Gibbons v.
Ogden 22 U.S. 1, 9 (1824). In order to determine whether preemption exists, the court
must first examine Congressional intent. Id. A state’s actions can be preempted by
express statutory language, by implication from a congressional scheme, or by
implication from conflict. Id.
199 Id.
200 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).
201 Bobroff, supra note 194; Somers, supra note 194.
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under the Supremacy Clause are generally afforded only prospective
injunctive relief.202
B. The Rise of Medicaid Preemption
The Eighth Circuit, in Lankford v. Sherman,203 concluded that a
preemption claim to enforce Medicaid’s requirements was viable even in
the absence of a cognizable § 1983 claim.204 The court examined a
plaintiff’s attempt to enforce Medicaid’s comparability and reasonablestandards requirements under both § 1983 (post-Gonzaga) and the
Supremacy Clause.205 Applying the Blessing test and the constricting
standards of Gonzaga, the court concluded that the plaintiff had no
§ 1983 cause of action.206
The court then addressed the viability of a preemption claim and
expressly noted that preemption claims afford plaintiffs an alternative
theory of relief because they are analyzed under a different legal
framework than § 1983 claims.207 Moreover, the Supremacy Clause
requires that when states choose to accept the benefits of Spending
Clause legislation they must comply with federal requirements. 208
Therefore, even if no cause of action exists under § 1983, the Eighth
Circuit concluded it was free to examine state compliance with federal
law under the Supremacy Clause.209 The Fifth Circuit followed, holding
that providers “have an implied cause of action to seek injunctive relief
from a state statute purportedly preempted by federal Spending Clause
legislation.”210 So far, all circuit courts that have addressed the issue
have held that the Medicaid Act is the supreme law of the land and
presumptively affords a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. 211
202 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (noting wellestablished framework for injunctive relief which requires a showing of a likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable harm, that the balance of equities are in the moving
parties favor, and that the relief is in the public interest).
203 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006).
204 Id. at 500.
205 Id. at 500. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(B), (a)(17) (2006).
206 Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509.
207 Id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989)).
208 Id. at 510.
209 Id.
210 Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 2005).
211 Compare Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1060–61
(9th Cir. 2008), Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 331–32, Lankford v. Sherman,451 F. 3d at 496,
with Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007). In
Equal Access, the plaintiffs asserted Supremacy Clause and § 1983 claims and the court
held that no § 1983 cause of action existed, yet completely ignored and never addressed
the Supremacy Clause claim and remanded the case for dismissal with prejudice. 509
F.3d at 704.
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The Second and Ninth Circuits have both addressed whether
§ 30(A) in particular can be enforced pursuant to preemption theory. In
Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry,212 a
group of providers and beneficiaries challenged California’s plan to cut
provider reimbursement by 10%.213 The district court dismissed the
claim, holding that § 30(A) does not confer rights under the Gonzaga
framework, and therefore, the claim also failed under the Supremacy
Clause.214 The Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that “[t]he Supreme Court
has repeatedly entertained claims for injunctive relief based on federal
preemption, without requiring that the standards for bringing suit under
§ 1983 be met.”215 Moreover, the court stated “even as the Supreme
Court has tightened the requirements for seeking damages under § 1983,
it has consistently reaffirmed the availability of injunctive relief to
prevent state officials from implementing state legislation allegedly
preempted by federal law.”216 The court concluded that its decision
“simply reaffirm[ed] over a century’s worth of precedent.”217 The Ninth
Circuit was the first court to hold that a cause of action under the
Supremacy Clause is available when seeking to enforce § 30(A).
It must be emphasized that the statutory remedies available under
§ 1983 are no longer available.218 For example, a cause of action based
on § 1983 includes legal damages and attorney’s fees for successful
plaintiffs, while a preemption cause of action generally affords neither.219
Moreover, courts interpreted the Medicaid Act, including § 30(A) preGonzaga, analyzing it under the § 1983 framework. Now that the cause
of actions differs, courts have been urged to reinterpret § 30(A). The
Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument on several grounds.220 HHS
recently issued a proposed rule clarifying the requirements of § 30(A)
and potentially resolving the current circuit split.221 The Supreme Court
212

543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1052.
214 Id. at 1054.
215 Id. at 1055.
216 Id. at 1063.
217 Id. at 1066.
218 Pa. Pharm. Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 536 n.5 (3rd Cir. 2002) (Becker, C.J.
dissenting) (noting that attorney fees are available to a successful § 1983 plaintiff).
219 Id.
220 In Independent Living Center v. Maxwell Jolly, the Ninth Circuit adopted its preGonzaga interpretation of the § 30(A), amid extensive challenges by the state. 572 F.3d
644, 653–57 (9th Cir. 2009). The court stated that “[t]he Director has not provided any
coherent reason why the purpose underlying § 30(A) would be different for purposes of
federal preemption than it was for direct enforcement under § 1983, and we see none.” Id.
at 653.
221
76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26343 (May 6, 2011) The proposed rule requires states to
consider access data prior and to collect input from patients and providers before
213
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has granted certiorari to determine whether providers and beneficiaries
can file suit under the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 30(A), which may
significantly impact access to care.222
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: HEALTH REFORM AND EQUAL ACCESS
The Affordable Care Act expands the role of states in providing
health care to low-income populations, making it crucial that states
administer Medicaid in compliance with federal law. States must adopt
rates that assure access to care if the goals of the reform legislation are to
be realized. The circuit split addressed supra demonstrates the
difficulties faced by providers and patients as to whether Congressional
demands under the Medicaid statute are even enforceable, due to the
varying jurisdictional requirements and the statute’s ambiguities.
Moreover, the broad and undefined language of § 30(A) provides little
guidance to state policy-makers which has in turn led to rate cuts and
decreased access.
In response to the courts’ retreat from § 1983, a legislative response
is necessary to ensure that states comply with Medicaid’s minimum
requirements and to ensure that all citizens receive adequate access to
care. If Congress fails to act, Medicaid’s expansion will likely result in a
large number of newly enrolled beneficiaries with limited access to care.
Congress must expressly declare that the Medicaid Act affords both
providers and beneficiaries rights that can be enforced against states that
fail to comply with the statute’s substantive requirements. Congress
must also provide states with the option to adopt federal rates that are set
by HHS, which will in turn relieve states of liability for rate-making
decisions. Finally, Congress must provide incentives for states to
monitor compliance and achieve quality and access similar to the
framework provided used to implement accountable care organizations.
A. Private Enforcement
A private right of action is necessary to ensure that states comply
with Medicaid’s requirements. A private right of action encourages
provider participation by creating a mechanism to recoup financial
reducing or restricting Medicaid rates. Id. at 26361–62. States must submit to CMS an
analysis of Medicaid rates and their impact on access to care, which CMS can disapprove
or take compliance action. Id. States must also conduct ongoing access reviews and
when access issues are identified a corrective action plan with specific steps and
timelines must be submitted to address the issue within 90 days of discovery. Id.
222 Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem. Hosp., No. 10-283, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 735, 735
(Jan. 18, 2011).
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damages incurred as a result of accepting Medicaid patients at belowcost rates. The private cause of action is a safety net for those
contemplating participation in the program. Currently, providers have no
guarantee that they will not suffer tremendous financial loss by
volunteering to participate in Medicaid.
Moreover, a private right of action provides security to Medicaid
beneficiaries and in part, serves to eliminate the stigma of being enrolled
in a welfare program. For example, under the current system, lowincome patients face tremendous legal hurdles when seeking medical
assistance. Unfortunately, neither the federal nor state governments are
monitoring state compliance.223 Thus, patients are ignored with a bus
ticket to nowhere and no recourse to recoup financial losses that may
have occurred when states violate the law by limiting access to care. A
private right of action sends the message that beneficiaries are important,
and if their rights are ignored, the state will compensate those in need.
Furthermore, enacting a private cause of action is a fiscally
conservative approach that will result in long-term savings for the federal
government. The private cause of action, similar to a qui tam suit under
the False Claims Act,224 empowers patients and providers to monitor the
use of federal funds by financially strapped states. By allowing patients
and providers to police state compliance, Medicaid must be administered
efficiently in order to protect against watered-down programs that delay
access resulting in costly care. The private cause of action puts the
ability to help enforce the law in the hands of those affected by state
decisions and forces states to pay attention to those who need care.
Although some plaintiffs have experienced success pursuing a
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause, this too may deteriorate, as
two Justices have stated that this path to compliance is not viable when
enforcing Spending Clause legislation.225 Moreover, preemption claims
do not allow recovery of legal damages or attorney’s fees.226 Thus, when
states cut Medicaid rates, resulting in extended wait or travel times to
223

According to a new rule proposed by HHS, states will be required to submit access
data to CMS when restructuring or reducing Medicaid rates. 76 Fed. Reg. 26361–62
(May 6, 2011). The rule would also require states to consider input from beneficiaries
and stakeholders. Id. Finally, the rule will require that states and the federal
governments monitor access issues. Id.
224 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006).
225 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675, 683 (2003) (Scalia,
J. concurring) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas expressed
serious doubts as to the availability of a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause
when seeking to enforce Spending Clause legislation. Id. Accordingly, both Justices
suggested that the only remedy available when states violate Spending Clause legislation
is the withdrawal of federal funds. Id.
226 Bobroff, supra note 194. Somers, supra note 194.
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access care, states are not financially liable to the affected beneficiaries.
Under the preemption theory, rate cuts may be enjoined, but physicians
and beneficiaries receive no compensation for filing suit, pursuing an
appeal, or accepting Medicaid patients at unlawful rates. Thus, the
Supremacy Clause cause of action does not encourage provider
participation and provides little recourse for beneficiaries. Without a
private cause of action, states are free to violate the law and restrict
access with little to no consequence.
Congress should enact a private cause of action to allow providers
and beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Act and its regulations. This
private right would alleviate the legal burdens faced by patients and
providers, and provide each a day in court. The private right should
allow for attorney’s fees and legal damages, to assure provider
participation and guard against uncompensated time spent on waiting
lists or travelling across the state to access care often experienced by
Medicaid beneficiaries. Additionally, the threat of legal damages and
attorney’s fees deters unlawful state action and fosters a cooperative and
attentive relationship among states, providers, and beneficiaries. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the private cause of action ensures that
federal money is spent according to federal guidelines, thus resulting in
full-strength programs that live up to the goals of reform.
B. Universal Rates and Accountable Care
In addition to the private cause of action, Congress should provide
states with the option of adopting rates set at the federal level. By
adopting the federal rates, states would be relieved from liability incurred
under the private cause of action. The federal Medicaid rates should be
equal to Medicare rates for services reimbursed under Medicare. For
those services not reimbursed under Medicare, such as certain types of
costly long-term care, HHS should examine current state rates and adjust
for quality and access measures. The universal rates should cut down on
administrative inefficiencies and financial inequity, thus improving
provider participation and beneficiary access.
Moreover, rate
consistency across public programs would help eliminate, to a certain
extent, the ability to shift costs between public and private payers.
The Affordable Care Act contains numerous provisions that focus
on payment strategies to reduce costs and improve access, and Medicaid
and Medicare universal rates should be a primary focus. Under the
Affordable Care Act, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
(“the Innovation Center”) was created to “test innovative payment and
service delivery models to reduce program expenditures . . . while
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preserving or enhancing the quality of care furnished to individuals.”227
Like § 30(A), the Innovation Center also seeks to improve access,
increase quality, and promote efficient care.
As part of its quality and efficiency studies, the Center should
develop a universal rate system that ties Medicaid reimbursement to
Medicare reimbursement, similar to the way in which the Affordable
Care Act seeks to provide equal access to primary care physicians.
Under such a system, access would improve and states would be relieved
of financial liability under a private cause of action as they would no
longer control rates. In addition to decreasing administrative obstacles at
the provider level, such a system would promote efficiency by
eliminating duplication among rate setting agencies. For example, under
the new rule proposed by HHS, both the federal and state governments
will be responsible for monitoring and adjusting rates to ensure access to
care. If federal rates are adopted, states would no longer be required to
adjust payments, eliminating an administrative cost at the state level.
Over time, additional costs could be eliminated by reducing
duplication and administrative barriers experienced by providers
participating in both Medicare and Medicaid. For example, program
reform should focus on efficiency by streamlining conditions of
participation, forms, codes, and additional administrative measures into a
single administrative body. Such a system would eliminate current
inefficiencies which require providers and beneficiaries to navigate the
federal and state framework when seeking reimbursement for care.
Finally, the system would promote equality between Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries throughout the country, eliminating the stigma of
Medicaid. Rather than focusing on setting rates to assure access to care,
the legislative focus at the state level would turn toward improving
efficiency and quality while decreasing costs.
The federal government should also provide states with a new
incentive to manage and monitor the care provided across Medicaid
programs. In order to do so, states should be rewarded or penalized
based on their ability to administer the program efficiently and their
ability to meet certain quality and access measures. Thus, states under
this system will in essence become Accountable Care Organizations
(ACO) as developed under the Affordable Care Act.228 An ACO is “an
organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the
quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries.”229 ACO
227

Affordable Care Act § 3021 (2010).
Id. § 3022.
229 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE “ACCOUNTABLE
CARE ORGANIZATIONS”
228
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participants are eligible for a portion of shared savings payments
attributed to increased efficiency and coordination of care provided that
quality benchmarks are satisfied.230 The ACO concept should be
expanded to include the coordination of care provided to Medicaid
beneficiaries.
For example, when developing a statewide ACO, the federal
government could provide incentives for states (based on federal
benchmarks) which might include increased FMAP or funding for
additional services or even the ability of the state to keep any cost
savings due to efficiency efforts. Federal benchmarks would include
access and quality goals similar to those imposed by § 30(A). States that
meet these goals would be eligible for incentive payments, just like
groups of providers would be eligible for shared savings as part of an
ACO. The program would give states flexibility to implement their
Medicaid programs but would also require close federal oversight to
monitor the extent to which states achieve the goals of Medicaid and
health reform. A statewide ACO would also eliminate many of the fraud
and abuse issues and anti-trust concerns confronting providers under the
current ACO program.
New Jersey has proposed an ACO demonstration project to
encourage efficiency and decrease costs among Medicaid providers.231
Under this program, Medicaid providers in an ACO would be eligible for
shared savings payments similar to the payments distributed under the
Medicare ACO program.232 States across the country could adopt similar
programs, or the federal government could expand its ACO program to
include Medicaid providers. Ultimately, however, states (in addition to
groups of providers) should be held accountable for providing access to
quality care for Medicaid beneficiaries. A federal program that treats
states as ACOs may be the best way to promote accountability for equal
care.
In sum, a move towards federal rates may encourage the
development of innovative programs among the states that focus on the
efficiency and economy of care they provide. The option proposed here
allows states to retain the flexibility they currently have when adopting
Medicaid reimbursement rates. It also allows providers and beneficiaries
to file suit against states if rates are not set within the parameters of
federal law. State rate-setting decisions should be measured by
SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM – NEW SECTION 1899
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS (2010).
230 Id.
231 S2443, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011).
232 Id.

OF
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substantive results, which should be clarified by Congress or HHS in
objective measurable terms. A state’s ability to provide access to
quality, economical, and efficient care should be measured according to
similar, objective standards adopted by regulation for ACOs. Moreover,
if states choose to adopt federal Medicaid rates, states should be relieved
from future liability under a private cause of action by patients and
providers seeking to enforce § 30(A). A system that seeks to streamline
the provision of medical assistance under both federal and state programs
may actually encourage provider participation and leaves open the option
of rewarding states (as ACOs) for structuring Medicaid programs in
order to achieve quality and efficiency goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
Medicaid has been widely out of favor according to many
Americans due to its lack of quality and access. Medicare, on the other
hand, is a sacred entitlement and private insurance is viewed by some as
the ultimate path to accessible, quality care. Congress enacted
Medicaid’s Equal Access provision to ensure that states set rates so that
inequities between private and public programs did not occur.
Unfortunately, issues of quality and access have been left to the states
and the federal courts. Although difficult, Congress must revise and
enact measurable standards to fix its past shortcomings and to assure that
states provide an accessible safety net.
Due to the economic recession and recent reform measures,
Medicaid will play a larger role in providing care to low income
Americans. The federal government has generously extended funds to
encourage states to establish Medicaid programs, yet federal standards
are either too flexible or states are not being held accountable for the care
they are required to provide. Many states are taking advantage of this
flexibility by cutting reimbursement rates to balance budgets.
Additionally, the courts have had difficulty interpreting the language of
the statute, which provides insufficient guidance. In turn, providers and
beneficiaries have been required to overcome immense legal hurdles to
assure that states provide medical assistance according to federal law.
In response, Congress should extend a private right of action to
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries by clearly expressing its intent to
create a right to access medical assistance. As a complementary
alternative to requiring that states achieve substantive results, Congress
should develop a universal rate system for its public programs. This
option would relieve state liability under § 30(A) and move the nation
one step closer towards equal access to care among both low-income and
elderly populations. Finally, the Accountable Care Organization concept
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should be expanded to include Medicaid providers as well as the states.
The federal government should provide incentives for providing equal
access to quality care and the states should do the same with respect to
encouraging efficiency among Medicaid providers. These actions clarify
multiple circuit splits and protect states, providers, beneficiaries, and the
federal budget, and bolster the goals of health reform.

